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WE ARE NEW YORK’S LAW SCHOOL
New York Law School Health Law Colloquium

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION
IN HEALTH CARE AND HEALTH COVERAGE—
WHAT’S HAPPENING; GOOD OR BAD?
DATE

November 5, 2018
TIME

6:00 p.m.–7:45 p.m.
LOCATION

New York Law School
W301
185 West Broadway
New York, NY 10013
CLE

1 credit in Ethics and
Professionalism and 1
credit in Professional
Practice (NY transitional
and nontransitional)

MODERATOR
Adam Herbst Esq., M.B.A., Chief Legal, Planning and Government
Relations Officer for Blythedale Children’s Hospital and Adjunct Professor,
New York Law School
PANELISTS
Richard N. Gottfried, Chair, New York State Assembly Health Committee
Jeffrey Farber, M.D., President and CEO, The New Jewish Home
Nancy Neveloff Dubler LL.B., Consultant for Ethics, NYC Health +
Hospitals, Medical & Professional Affairs, Adjunct Professor, Division of
Medical Ethics, NYU Langone Medical Center; Professor Emerita, The Albert
Einstein College of Medicine/Montefiore Medical Center
Salvatore J. Russo, Adjunct Professor of Law Brooklyn Law School and a
Fellow of the New York Academy of Medicine
Steffie Woolhandler, M.D., M.P.H., Distinguished Professor of Public
Health, City University of New York at Hunter College, Lecturer in Medicine,
Harvard Medical School, and Adjunct Clinical Professor and Staff Physician,
Albert Einstein College of Medicine/Montefiore Medical Center

RSVP: www.nyls.edu/HealthLaw
New York Law School is certified by the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board as an
Accredited Provider of continuing legal education in the State of New York. The school has been
serving the legal education needs of the greater New York area for more than 125 years, including
the continuing educational needs of its graduates and other area attorneys.

AGENDA
6:00pm Welcome – Anthony W. Crowell, Dean and President of New York Law School
6:05 – 7:50pm Panel Discussion Moderated by Adam Herbst, Chief Legal Officer,
Blythedale Children’s Hospital
CLE Details: NYLS is accredited by the State of New York to offer this program with 1
Credit of Ethics and Professionalism Continuing Legal Education and 1 Credit of
Professional Practice Continuing Legal Education. Transitional and Non‐Transitional use.

BIOS
Moderator:
Adam S. Herbst, Esq., MBA Mr. Herbst is Chief Legal, Planning and Government
Relations Officer for Blythedale Children’s Hospital. He also serves as the Hospital’s
Chief Compliance Officer. In this role, Mr. Herbst has legal and compliance oversight for
the Hospital and is responsible for developing corporate planning strategies and
administering government relations, the ethics program, as well as advocacy and
community relations. Mr. Herbst has devoted a considerable portion of his career
specializing at the intersection of where health care law meets with communications,
technology and ethical issues. Mr. Herbst has worked on issues related to housing,
education, public health, economic development and has trial experience in both
federal and state courts, as well as arbitrations throughout the country. He is a frequent
speaker on health care access and informed consent. Mr. Herbst is an Adjunct Professor
at New York Law School, teaching Health Law and Policy, and is also the Co‐Director of
the Health Law Clinic.

Panelists:
NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER LL.B. is Consultant for Bioethics at the New York City Health
and Hospitals Corporation and Adjunct Professor at NYU Langone Division of Bioethics.
She is Professor Emerita at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine and formerly Head of
the Division of Bioethics at Montefiore Medical Center. She received her B.A. from
Barnard College and her LL.B. from the Harvard Law School. She lectures extensively and
is the author of numerous articles and books on termination of care, home care and
long‐term care, geriatrics, adolescent medicine, prison and jail health care, and AIDS.
Her most recent books are: Bioethics Mediation: A Guide to Shaping Shared Solutions,
co‐author, Carol Liebman, Vanderbilt University Press, 2011; The Ethics and Regulation
of Research with Human Subjects, Coleman, Menikoff, Goldner and Dubler, Lexis/nexis,
2005; Ethics for Health Care Organizations: Theory, Case Studies, and Tools, with Jeffrey
Blustein and Linda Farber Post (2002). She consults often with federal agencies,
national working groups and bioethics centers.

Jeffrey I. Farber, MD, is the President and CEO of The New Jewish Home (TNJH) in New
York, a health system for older adults which serves more than 10,000 clients annually
through a diverse portfolio of services including short‐term rehabilitation, long‐term
skilled nursing, low‐income housing, day programs, and a wide range of home health
and care management programs across 3 campuses in Bronx, Manhattan, and
Westchester. The organization is committed to transforming eldercare for New Yorkers
so they can live meaningful lives in the places they call home. Technology, innovation,
applied research and new models of care put The New Jewish Home at the vanguard of
eldercare providers across the country.
Prior to joining TNJH in December 2017, Dr. Farber served as Chief Medical Officer and
Senior Vice President of Population Health at Mount Sinai Health System, New York,
where his responsibilities included overseeing clinical operations to drive performance
in the health system’s value based contracts, managing total cost of care for > 300,000
lives across all lines of business. He led the development and monitoring of programs
and systems to evaluate the quality, value, and efficiency of care across the clinically
integrated network of 3400 physicians, including practice transformation, patient and
provider engagement, care management, and specialized clinical solutions.
Dr. Farber received his MD from Albert Einstein College of Medicine of Yeshiva
University and a Masters in Business Administration from University of Massachusetts
Amherst, and is Associate Professor of Geriatric Medicine, Icahn School of Medicine at
Mount Sinai.
Dr. Farber’s research interests include models of care for older adults, population health
management, and the clinical interface with healthcare finance. He is a nationally
recognized speaker and has twice received federal grant funding through the U.S.
Health Resources and Services Administration. Dr. Farber’s research has been published
in The Annals of Internal Medicine, JAMA Internal Medicine, and The Journal of Hospital
Medicine.

ASSEMBLY MEMBER RICHARD N. GOTTFRIED
CHAIR, COMMITTEE ON HEALTH
Richard N. Gottfried has chaired the New York State Assembly Committee on Health
since 1987. He is a Democrat representing the 75th Assembly District in Manhattan. He
is a leading state health policy‐maker not only in New York but also nationally.
His work has focused on creating and expanding public health insurance programs in
New York, including Child Health Plus. He sponsors the N.Y. Health Act to create a
universal publicly funded single‐payer health plan – like an improved version of

Medicare but for everyone.
reproductive freedom.

He is a leading proponent of patient autonomy and

He sponsored the law to allow medical use of marijuana and works to expand it. His
legislative work includes: promoting primary and preventive care; authorizing formation
of accountable care organizations (ACOs); the Health Care Proxy Law (which allows
people to designate an agent to make health care decisions for them if they lose
decision‐making capacity); the Family Health Care Decisions Act (which enables family
members to make health care decisions for incapacitated patients who have not signed
a health care proxy); managed care reforms; giving patients access to information about
a doctor's background and malpractice record; licensing of midwives; insurance
coverage for midwife services; and the HIV Testing and Confidentiality Law. He works to
protect funding for Medicaid, community health centers, school health clinics, HIV/AIDS
services, and other health concerns.
He is a graduate of Cornell University (1968) and Columbia Law School (1973). He is a
member of the New York Academy of Medicine, the National Academy for State Health
Policy, the Public Health Association of New York City, the New York Civil Liberties
Union, the Reforming States Group, the Art Students League of New York, and the China
Institute. He was first elected to the Assembly in 1970.

Salvatore J. Russo is a health care lawyer with over thirty‐seven years of experience. He
is the recently retired Senior Vice President and General Counsel of NYC Health +
Hospitals. Mr. Russo was the corporate officer in‐charge of equal employment
opportunity at NYC Health + Hospitals. Mr. Russo was secretary for the Board of
Directors of NYC Health + Hospitals. He was the secretary and member of the board of
directors of the NYC Health + Hospitals Assistance Corporation (DSRIP CSO). Mr. Russo
has previously served as the In‐house Counsel for Maimonides Medical Center of
Brooklyn, Director of Legal Affairs for the Greater New York Hospital Association, and
Counsel to the Health Leaders of New York, formerly known as the Metropolitan Health
Administrators Association. Mr. Russo is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of New York
University College of Arts and Science. He was awarded the degree of Juris Doctor from
Hofstra University School of Law School. Mr. Russo has the distinction of receiving the
award for school service from his high school, college (Dean Robert Bruce Dow Medal)
and law school, respectively.
Mr. Russo is Adjunct Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School. He also is a Fellow of the
New York Academy of Medicine. Mr. Russo writes and lectures extensively in the area of
medical/legal topics. He is a contributing author for, “The Legal Manual for New York
Physicians (first, second & third editions),” and “The Complete and Easy Guide to Health
Law.” Some of his other publications include, “All Right, Mr. DeMille, I am Ready for my
Close‐up, (A Health Care Lawyer’s Practical Guide to Considerations to Negotiating a
Film/TV Contract),” and, “In the Matter of AB,” which were both published in the New

York State Bar Association Health Law Journal. In addition to being an adjunct law school
professor, Mr. Russo has been a speaker on various topics in health law at Fordham Law
School, Brooklyn Law School, Seton Hall Law School, and Queens Law School, as well as
at numerous programs for bar associations and other professional organizations.
Mr. Russo is on the Executive Committee and is a member of the Nominations
Committee of the Health Law Section of the New York State Bar Association (“NYSBA”).
He is also the past Chair of the Health Law Section of the NYSBA. He is a past member of
the House of Delegates of the NYSBA. Mr. Russo is the past Co‐chair of the Health Rights
Committee of the Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities of the American Bar
Association. Mr. Russo is the past Chair of the Public Health Committee of the New York
State Bar Association. He is also the past Chair of both the American Bar Association’s
AIDS Coordinating Committee, and the Special Committee on AIDS and the Law of the
New York State Bar Association. Mr. Russo is a member of the New York City Bar
Association and the New York State Bar Association.
Mr. Russo has received honors and awards from various organizations. In 2015, 2016
and 2017, Mr. Russo received the highest possible rating of “AV Preeminent” for both
legal ability and ethical standards from Martindale‐Hubbell. He is the Joseph P. Crisalli
2010 Award for Distinguished Service recipient from the Congress of Italian‐Americans
Organization. Mr. Russo was recognized as a Distinguished Law School Alumnus, and
was awarded the Hofstra University School of Law Outstanding Public Service Award for
2007. He was selected as Seton Hall Law School Health Law & Policy Program’s
Distinguished Guest Practitioner for 2006. Additionally, Mr. Russo is the recipient of the
Senior Level Healthcare Executives Regent’s Award for 2003 of the American College of
Healthcare Executives, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation Diversity
Award 2002 (Corporate Headquarters Division), the Xaverian High School Alumnus of
Distinction Award for 2000, and the 1999 Health Leaders of New York, formerly known
as Metropolitan Health Administrators Association, Award of Distinction.
Mr. Russo is active in his community and serves as a member of the Board of Trustees of
Xaverian High School in Brooklyn, New York. He also serves as a member of the Board
of Directors of St. Athanasius Academy in Brooklyn, New York. Mr. Russo is an emeritus
member of the Board of Directors of the Congress of Italian‐Americans Organization. He
is a liturgical minister at St. Athanasius Roman Catholic Church in Brooklyn, New York.
Mr. Russo is married to his high school sweetheart for thirty‐seven years, Sandy, an
Associate Professor, Chair and Director of the Department of Nursing at Touro College.
They have three children, Stephen, Matthew and Christopher. The Russo family resides
in Brooklyn, New York.
Steffie Woolhandler, M.D., MPH is a Distinguished Professor at The City University of
New York's Hunter College, a primary‐care doctor in the South Bronx, and a Lecturer in
Medicine at Harvard Medical School, where she was formerly Professor of Medicine. A
native of Louisiana, she graduated from LSU Medical School in New Orleans, and

completed an internal medicine residency at Cambridge Hospital and a research
fellowship in General Internal Medicine at Harvard. During her stint as a Robert Wood
Johnson Health Policy Fellow at the Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of
Medicine) she worked with Senator Paul Wellstone and then‐Congressman Bernie
Sanders. She has published more than 150 journal articles, reviews, chapters and books
on health policy and is a leading advocate of non‐profit national health insurance for the
United States She, along with Dr. David Himmelstein co‐founded Physicians for a
National Health Program. Among her influential scholarly articles are studies on patient
dumping (which led to a federal ban on that practice, medical bankruptcy (co‐authored
with Elizabeth Warren), waste in hospitals and in medicine more generally , the lethality
of being uninsured and proposals for single payer health reform.
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REJECT CVS‐AETNA ACQUISITION
Testimony of Richard N. Gottfried, Chair, Assembly Committee on Health
New York State Department of Financial Services Public Hearing on:
Application by CVS Health Corporation and CVS Pharmacy, Inc. for Approval of
Acquisition of Control of Aetna Health Insurance Company of New York
Thursday, October 18, 2018
One State Street, New York, NY
My name is Richard N. Gottfried. I chair the New York State Assembly Committee
on Health. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. I urge the Department of Financial
Services to reject the proposal by CVS Health Corporation and CVS Pharmacy, Inc. to
acquire control of Aetna Health Insurance Company of New York. This acquisition would
impair the health insurance market in New York, harm the quality and accessibility of health
care for New York consumers, and significantly advance dangerous trends in health care and
health coverage. It should be rejected under Insurance Law §1506. .
CVS operates the nation’s largest retail pharmacy chain, owns one of the largest
pharmacy benefit managers, is the nation’s second-largest provider of individual prescription
drug plans, with approximately 4.8 million members, and had revenues of approximately
$185 billion in 2017. It is a giant whose current size and scope of activities ought to raise
loud anti-trust and anti-consumer alarms. This deal would give it control of Aetna, the
nation’s third-largest health insurance company and fourth-largest individual prescription
drug plan insurer, with over two million prescription drug plan members, and with revenues
of approximately $60 billion in 2017. If the term “anti-competitive” has any meaning at all,
it must mean a deal like this.
Entities seeking monopolistic power always claim that their size will somehow
benefit the consumers and others who will be at their mercy. And it is never true. In this
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case, what is at stake is not only competition in the insurance market but the control, quality
and accessibility of health care for millions of consumers.
This needs to be seen in a broader and profoundly threatening context.
Decades ago, health care began to change from being based on small entities and
professional practices. Driven partly by the possibilities and costs of technology and partly by the
need to deal with large third-party payers instead of relying on individual patients for payment,
health care providers began to form larger and larger economic organizations, driven increasingly
by economic rather than professional imperatives.
Integration can have important benefits. A general hospital is by its nature an integrated
health care provider. Insurance is an integration of risk. But integration can go well beyond what
is driven by or serves clinical or risk-sharing needs.
There is horizontal integration among providers on the same level – e.g., large or multispecialty physician practices, or hospitals merging or affiliating in networks – and among payers –
higher degrees of market control among fewer and increasingly dominant insurance companies.
In addition, there is vertical integration among providers, as, e.g., more and more
physicians practice as employees of hospitals or hospital-controlled practices. Retail and
pharmacy chains like CVS and Walmart are opening “drop-in” clinics on their premises, and these
are expanding into full-scale medical practices.
We are now beginning to see vertical integration involving payers being economically
integrated with clinical providers. We see the beginnings of insurance companies owning or
controlling hospital and physician networks.
The CVS-Aetna deal would constitute the integration of one of the largest pharmacy
chains – which is already integrated with one of the largest pharmacy benefit managers and a
growing number of retail clinics – with one of the largest insurance companies.
Some would assert that New York’s laws against the corporate practice of medicine and
limits on corporate ownership of hospitals protect us from having our health care providers being
taken over by corporations like CVS or Aetna. If only that were so.
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Supermarkets like Price Chopper and pharmacy chains like CVS or Duane-Reade may not
technically own their retail clinics. They rent space to physician practices. But when the
commercial landlord also provides advertising and marketing, management services, electronic
record systems, financing for capital equipment, etc., then the retailer might as well own the
physician practice. Nothing in New York law limits that practice to episodic “drop in” services or
prevents it from becoming a full-blown practice, office-based surgery, or almost anything else.
How can a private office-based practice compete with the advertising and branding power of a
clinic attached to a national pharmacy chain?
If a market-dominant insurance company like Aetna is teamed up with a giant like CVS
that develops a full network of corporate-controlled health care providers, it is easy for the
insurance company-corporate combination to drive patients to its owned or controlled providers,
using tools like restricted provider networks and payment arrangements.
What happens to a health care professional’s professionalism and ability to advocate for
the patient when the professional is an actual or virtual employee of a large system controlled by a
giant insurance company or other corporation? What happens to patient choice, or the ability of a
free-standing health care provider to compete, innovate, or survive?
The tendency of economic organizations to horizontal and vertical integration is both
dangerous and nearly inexorable. As those entities amass greater and greater power from the
combination of horizontal and vertical integration – we could call it “rectangular integration” –
that power is used for the benefit of the entity’s owners, to the disadvantage of its subcontractors
or employees (in this case, hospitals, doctors, nurses), its customers (patients), and any
independent providers left outside the structure.
I do not want to see health care and health coverage go down that dark path. We all have a
responsibility to stand in the way of that degradation at every opportunity.
Rejection of the CVS-Aetna deal by the Department of Financial Services will not win the
war against that degradation, but it would be a great victory in an important battle for New
Yorkers.
#

Opening Statement of DFS Superintendent Maria T. Vullo for the DFS
Hearing Regarding the Application by CVS Health Corporation and CVS
Pharmacy, Inc. to acquire Aetna Health Insurance Company of New York
Opening Statement: CVS‐Aetna Public Hearing
Good morning. I am Maria Vullo, the New York State Superintendent of Financial
Services. I am joined today by Laura Evangelista, Executive Deputy Superintendent for
Insurance, and Troy Oechsner, Deputy Superintendent for Health Insurance.
Pursuant to New York Insurance Law Section 1506, we are holding this public hearing to
consider the application by CVS Health Corporation and CVS Pharmacy, Inc. to acquire Aetna
Health Insurance Company of New York, a subsidiary of Aetna Inc. This transaction has
received a significant amount of attention – for good reason. As proposed by the parties, the
transaction has potential benefits. But it also presents potential risks, to markets, consumers
and the people of the State of New York, who in my role as Superintendent, I am duty‐bound to
protect where I can.
It is important to note that NYDFS has specific approval authority with regard to this
transaction as to the proposed acquisition by CVS of Aetna Health Insurance Company of New
York, one of Aetna Inc’s subsidiaries. NYDFS also acts in an advisory capacity to the
Commissioner of Health with regard to approval of the acquisition of control of two New York
Managed Care Organizations, Aetna Health Inc. (HMO) and Aetna Better Health Inc. (Managed
Long Term Care Plan). In addition, Aetna has three Connecticut domestic insurers that hold DFS
licenses to transact insurance business in the State of New York, including Aetna Life Insurance
Company, and this hearing is also to consider the potential impact of the proposed transaction
on those New York licensees and – most importantly – the impact on Aetna’s New York
policyholders.
Just yesterday, the Connecticut Insurance Department, which held its public hearing on
October 4, approved the change of control application for Aetna Life. Because the Connecticut
company sells a very substantial number of insurance policies in New York, prior to the public
hearing in Connecticut, I sent a letter to the Connecticut Insurance Department outlining some
of DFS’s significant concerns with regard to this proposed transaction. I did so because
Connecticut domiciled insurance companies write a significant number of health insurance
policies to New Yorkers, and Connecticut is the state where CVS’s change of control
applications with regard to those Aetna companies were filed and subject to review.
The U.S. Department of Justice approved the CVS/Aetna transaction last week, subject to
a consent decree requiring the divestiture, by Aetna, of its Medicare Part D prescription drugs
coverage. While that decision addressed horizontal aspects of this transaction from the
insurance perspective – specifically the proposed combination of CVS and Aetna’s Part D
businesses – unfortunately the Justice Department has taken a very myopic view and failed to

address the substantial impacts that this vertical integration would have on consumers across
the country.
There is no question that this transaction, were it to proceed, would have a significant
impact on New York. As New York’s insurance commissioner, my jurisdiction primarily lies in
the health insurance aspects of this transaction – and the impacts there are significant. In
2017, Aetna Life’s direct insurance business written in New York was approximately $3 billion in
premiums, which amount exceeds the direct premium writings of any other state or
territory. These premium writings in New York constituted 10.7% of the company’s total direct
accident and health insurance premium writings, and represented approximately 33% of the
overall accident and health insurance market share in New York. This makes New York a very
significant market for Aetna.
Although the Connecticut Insurance Department has now addressed CVS’s applications
for change of control regarding the Connecticut domiciled Aetna companies, those Aetna
companies that sell insurance in New York hold DFS licenses. Under New York’s Insurance Law,
the New York licenses of the Aetna companies (and the CVS insurers in the Part D market)
licensed in New York but domiciled in Connecticut, and all such companies licensed in New York
but domiciled in another State, are subject to annual renewal by DFS. Specifically, section
1106(b)(2) of the New York Insurance Law states, and I quote, “the superintendent shall issue a
renewal license to any foreign or alien insurer if satisfied, by such proof as (s)he may require,
that such an insurer is not delinquent with respect to any requirement imposed by this chapter
and that its continuance in business in this state will not be hazardous or prejudicial to the best
interests of the people of this state.” Accordingly, consideration of the renewal of the New
York licenses for the foreign insurers impacted by this transaction will be addressed as part of
our review of this proposed transaction, applying this statutory standard.
In addition, CVS, the proposed acquirer, operates as a retail pharmacy and, through
Caremark, as a pharmacy benefit manager, or PBM. These facts enhance the proposed
transaction’s substantial impact on New York’s health care market – a matter that, troublingly,
the Department of Justice did not consider. This transaction presents potential benefits – as
the parties have argued. But it also presents potential risks – including the risk of further
concentration and market dominance in the retail pharmacy market – to the potential
detriment of small businesses, including independent pharmacies, across New York State.
CVS Pharmacy is not a DFS regulated entity – but it is one of the applicants in the
proposed transaction we are considering today. Nor is Caremark a direct DFS regulated
entity. However, as a PBM, Caremark contracts with numerous health insurance companies
that insure millions of New Yorkers, not just Aetna, and so DFS is carefully looking at this
transaction through the lens of all of the health insurers in New York. DFS has previously
expressed substantial concerns about the role of PBMs in the high cost of pharmaceuticals, as
well as the non‐transparent nature of PBMs, which this proposed transaction now brings very
much to the forefront of consideration. Two years ago, DFS proposed legislation for the
licensing and direct supervision of all PBMs in New York State by DFS. Unfortunately, the State
Legislature did not pass that law. Several states have passed PBM licensing legislation ‐‐

including Kentucky which recently took action against CVS Caremark. DFS will continue to
advocate for legislation for the licensing of PBMs by DFS. In the meantime, DFS and will
continue to use its supervisory authority over health insurers to obtain much needed
information from PBMs, despite their opposition to transparency and regulation. This
background also informs the Department’s review of this transaction today.
Turning specifically to the application for change of control that is before NYDFS, Section
1506(b) of the New York Insurance Law provides that I, as the Superintendent, shall disapprove
an acquisition if I determine that such action is reasonably necessary to protect the interests of
the People of this State. Under New York law, the factors I am to consider in making this
determination include the financial condition of the acquiring person and the insurer, the
source of the funds or assets for the acquisition, whether the acquisition is likely to be
hazardous or prejudicial to the insurers, policyholders or shareholders, and whether the effect
of the acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition in any line of commerce in
insurance or tend to create a monopoly therein. In short, the statute provides very broad
authority, and my responsibility is to consider the impact on the people of New York State, and
to ensure that, were this transaction to proceed, adequate oversight will be obtained so that
promises being made by the companies today are kept – in terms of the reduction of costs to
consumers and the betterment of health care services to New Yorkers.
The Department has spent a substantial amount of time reviewing this transaction, and
has had numerous meetings with the applicants during which we have asked many questions
and requested further information. The purpose of this public hearing is to provide the public
with the opportunity to comment on this proposed acquisition so that the Department has
public input on the potential implications of the transaction for New York State, whether
positive or negative, as well as the impact on the availability, affordability, and quality of health
insurance in New York. In our notice of this hearing, we invited written comments and oral
testimony. To date, we have received a good number of written comments and ten witnesses
have asked to testify (in addition to the parties).
Everyone who has requested to be heard will be heard today. They will present their
testimony. I may ask questions. Based on those present here today, it appears we will have
the opportunity to hear from the parties themselves, from consumers, from providers, from
provider groups, and from members of the legislature. So, we have a full audience of people
wishing to be heard. I assure you that we will consider all comments, written and oral.
As described in the hearing notice, CVS and Aetna, who are the parties proposing this
transaction, each will have 10 minutes to describe the transaction, exclusive of questions,
followed by any other individuals or groups, each of whom will have 5 minutes for their
comments. If needed, after members of the public testify, I may ask CVS and/or Aetna to
answer additional questions. We will not close the hearing record today. We will follow up
with the companies as needed to request additional information. And, as stated in the hearing
notice, the public will have five business days after today to submit any additional written
comments – as information gathered at this hearing might cause members of the public to
provide additional information.

Before we go to the oral testimony today, I wanted to set forth a few issues that the
Department has been considering in evaluating this transaction:
 First: The Transaction’s Impact on Premiums. CVS claims that this transaction would

result in operational synergies and that the combined company would achieve
substantial cost savings. CVS also claims efficiency gains from its “minute‐clinics” in CVS
pharmacies, where consumers can stop in without an appointment to see a nurse or
physician’s assistant. As of today, it remains unclear whether, how or when these cost
savings would result in lower premiums or other actual savings to New York
consumers. It is imperative that any claims of cost savings be specified by the
companies from the perspective of the New York consumer, including the numerous
Aetna policyholders, and that guardrails are placed to ensure that the promises of today
– in order to obtain governmental approval – are actually realized.
 Second: The Transaction’s Impact on Pharmaceutical Costs. Pharmaceutical costs are the

single largest driver of premium increases today. As I mentioned, CVS owns a very large
Pharmacy Benefit Manager (PBM),CVS Caremark. We have great concerns that PBMs
are just another cog in the wheel for profit‐making – to consumers’ detriment. Today,
the top three PBMs control 70% of the business in this highly opaque industry. CVS
Caremark is one of the three PBMs with this dominant market power, and this merger, if
approved, would further cement its position by removing Aetna as a potential
competing client as well as a possible competitor in the PBM market. The consolidation
of existing PBMs with insurers would make it increasingly difficult for new, independent
companies to enter the PBM market.
It also is worth stressing that PBMs lack full transparency and are not directly regulated
in New York at the present time. As I said, DFS proposed a bill two years ago to gain full
transparency, through the licensing of PBMs, which we will continue to pursue before
the State Legislature. Regardless, were this transaction to proceed, DFS would have the
right to full transparency of CVS Caremark through our licensed insurers in the Aetna
group, and DFS would thereby have examination authority over the CVS entities through
New York’s existing holding company statutes.
Further, this transaction raises significant market competition concerns with respect to
pharmaceuticals, because CVS Caremark as a PBM would have the power – and the
financial incentive – to offer Aetna larger rebates or other significant discounts to draw
policyholders away from other insurers, resulting in an even larger market share. As a
result, small and regionally‐based carriers, without an affiliated PBM, may be
disadvantaged, thereby harming New York’s market and New York consumers. We are
told that this will not happen; DFS must have the ability to ensure that this in fact will be
the case were this transaction to proceed.
 Relatedly, We Are Concerned from a Competitive Standpoint That Aetna May Create

Incentives to use CVS Services, Leading to Drug Price Increases. Through this merger,
we are concerned that Aetna may create cost‐sharing structures, network designs, or
other incentives for its insureds to utilize CVS services over those of CVS’s competitors,

creating greater concentration in the retail pharmacy business, and harming
independent pharmacies. This would not only increase CVS’s market share in the retail
pharmacy industry, but the reduction in competition could result in the loss of small
businesses and higher drug prices passed on to consumers, including New York
policyholders of other insurance companies regulated by DFS.
 Third: The Department has Data Privacy Concerns. CVS Caremark currently has access to

drug claims data, patients’ electronic medical records, and other member information
from insurers that utilize its PBM services and that presently compete with Aetna. We
must ensure that this transaction will not compromise consumers’ data and that
consumer data is not shared within the post‐acquisition entities for the purpose of
increasing CVS’s and Aetna’s market share and profits. CVS must commit to strong
safeguards to protect and prevent the sharing of consumers’ data, both within the
organization and outside of it. In addition, the privacy of the data must be amply
protected from third parties and hackers. New York has been a leader in cybersecurity
and we must ensure that CVS, the entire enterprise, complies under New
York’s cybersecurity regulation. This transaction would create an even larger corporate
organization in the health care space. This means that a tremendous amount of
sensitive consumer data would be under the control of this very large corporate
enterprise. A data breach would have devastating consequences for consumers. We do
not want another Equifax or Anthem breach, so commitments in this area are
crucial. Regulatory oversight of any commitment to data privacy and protection is
essential to fully protect both consumers and competitors.
 Fourth: Financial Questions. The proposed transaction involves a considerable amount of

debt – over $40 billion – that CVS would be assuming to finance this transaction. The
Department has already expressed its concern that this increased debt may create
pressure on Aetna to raise premiums or take other actions that negatively impact
consumers. We understand that CVS has committed that the ultimate parent company
CVS Health – and only that company – will bear the responsibility for the transaction
debt, and that it will use CVS Health’s revenues from other business operations as well
as what otherwise would be dividends and share repurchases to pay down the debt. In
our view, there must be a clear, enforceable commitment that New Yorkers will not pay
a penny to finance this acquisition, in insurance premiums or otherwise. Also, the
considerable pressure to repay debt may cause the resulting company to repay its
substantial debt obligation before investing in other pro‐consumer measures, including
infrastructure improvements that would be beneficial to consumers and/or provide
relief to premiums for consumers. We must make sure the promises being made here
will be kept.
 Fifth: Community Support. As we all know, CVS has a substantial retail operation that is

present in many communities across New York State. One of the stated objectives of
this proposed transaction is that these retail stores will be utilized to further the
company’s expansion into the health care market. CVS claims that this transaction will
benefit consumers because of the geographic availability of CVS stores in communities
that can provide better access to certain health care services. At DFS, we are very

focused on ensuring that financial services companies are serving and investing in all of
New York’s communities across the State. I am very interested in hearing how CVS
intends to implement its business plan across New York State, in a manner that serves
New York’s communities fairly and equitably, including those communities most in need
of access to affordable health care services.
 Finally: Aetna’s Reach. As mentioned, Aetna insures millions of New Yorkers. As part of

this proposal, Aetna must commit to maintaining Aetna’s products, services networks
(without DFS’s approval) and that this transaction’s proposed savings are actually felt by
New Yorkers, including in premium reductions. I have already expressed my concerns
that Aetna has not participated in the individual market on the New York Exchange. If
the transaction proponents are really serious about their claim to protect New Yorkers
in communities across the State, then they will support the Affordable Care Act markets
in New York, assist New Yorkers who are uninsured and underinsured, and provide
health care service to everyone, not just the rich.
These are just some of the topics that I wanted to raise at the start of this hearing. These
topics have been raised previously in my letter to the Connecticut Insurance Department and in
meetings with CVS and Aetna. By no means does this summary indicate, one way or the other,
how the Department will decide the applications that are before us. I have made no decision
and will not do so until my dedicated staff and I hear all of the testimony, both oral and written.
This is a very significant transaction and there are some very strong views on all sides. As
I see it, the proponents of the transaction argue that the transaction will benefit the public in
reduced costs and better health care access – goals that we strongly support. On the other
side, however, there are significant risks in this transaction. Large corporate for‐profit
conglomerates do not have a good history of serving the public above their shareholders. And,
here, we have independent pharmacists, medical providers, the uninsured, consumers suffering
from too high pharmaceutical costs, who may suffer from this transaction. While we want to
believe the benefits being advocated, it is important that companies are held to account for the
advocacy that we are hearing in favor of this transaction – to ensure that it is not just puffery to
get the transaction approved. Regulators, including DFS, must have oversight going forward.
We will continue to accept written submissions within five business days after this
hearing. Anyone who wishes to submit a written statement should do so at the email address
or mailing address (email is preferred) on the Department’s website regarding this hearing. The
record will be closed on October 25, 2018, after which the matter will be fully submitted for the
Department’s determination.
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way we pay hospitals is toxic. It rewards, indeed
T herequires,
bad behavior from hospital leaders and stifles
the better angels of their nature.
In our market-driven payment system, hospitals’ success,
and even survival, depends on generating profits. Even nonprofit hospitals live or die based on profit margins (often
labeled Bsurpluses^ in non-profit facilities). Hospitals that lack
profits (or the prospect of future profits that can entice lenders
or investors) face a grim future. Unable to renovate or expand
their original facilities, purchase new equipment, acquire other
hospitals, or grow their provider networks, unprofitable hospitals often spiral downward. As one public hospital CEO
admonished two of us, Bno margin, no mission.^
In this issue of JGIM, Ly and Cutler1 demonstrate one
noxious side effect of making profitability the arbiter of hospital success. Their analysis of changes in hospital profit
margins between 2003 and 2013 indicates that hospitals won
the profit game by boosting prices, not by improving efficiency, or through exemplary community service (e.g., by increasing their care for Medicaid patients). The losers cared for a
disproportionate share of publicly insured patients (and presumably the uninsured, although Ly could not assess that) or
had the bad luck to be located in rural America. Public hospitals lagged, while not-for-profits grew their profits even faster
than for-profits. (Although not discernible from Ly’s analysis,
MedPAC data indicates that investor-owned hospitals had
much higher profit margins at baseline and retain a big profit
lead.2) Chaining up was a winning strategy, presumably because it increased hospitals’ leverage in negotiations with
insurers, allowing them to command higher prices.
Ly’s conclusion that upcoding did not drive profitability
gains will surprise many clinicians whose hospital managers
obsess about capturing every billable diagnosis. While the
study found a positive relationship between growth in a hospital’s casemix index (CMI) and growth in its profit margin,
this finding was not statistically significant. Unfortunately, this
analysis was underpowered because it used all-payer CMI
data, which was available for only a subsample of 587 hospiPublished online April 30, 2018
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tals in eight states. Nationwide, increases in the Medicare CMI
(available for almost all hospitals) strongly predict total margin growth (Dickman S, Woolhandler S, Himmelstein DU.
Unpublished analysis of Medicare Cost Report and Medicare
casemix data, 1998–2016). It seems likely that upcoding is an
important profit-driver.
Hospitals did not always have to turn a profit in order to
survive. In our past (and today in Canada, much of Europe,
and our VA system), funds for capital investments came from
government grants or charitable donations.
During the first three decades of the twentieth century,
private donors funded almost all US hospital construction.3
The federal government stepped in to provide capital funds to
non-profit hospitals during the Great Depression, and its HillBurton program was the major funder of hospital construction
in the post-war period. The seed of profit-based capital
funding was planted by the hospital industry-controlled Blue
Cross plans of that era, which paid hospitals a per diem rate
that covered operating costs (including interest on loans, i.e.,
payment for existing capital investments), plus depreciation
and a capital add-on to provide hospitals with reserves for
future capital investment.4 But even as late as 1965 (when
Congress passed Medicare and Medicaid), hospitals’ reserves
together with their long-term borrowing accounted for only
31.9% of hospital construction funds.5
Two developments in the mid-1960s accelerated the shift
from grant-based to profit margin-based funding for not-forprofit hospital capital. First, a 1963 IRS ruling triggered
states to start offering tax-exempt bond funding for hospital
construction, allowing hospitals to obtain loans with minimal
down payments, and pay them off with future profits. Second,
Medicare adopted Blue Cross’ capital payment model (with
an extra profit allowance for investor-owned facilities). For
hospitals with a good payer mix, this assured a flow of public
dollars to build up reserves for future investments, and to pay
off bondholders and investors. By the 1970s, 70% of construction was debt-funded, with much of the rest covered by
hospitals’ reserves.6
Before the mid 1960s, explicit (if often flawed) public
decision-making guided the allocation of government funding
for hospital construction. Thereafter, the flow of taxpayer
dollars surged but public control of decision-making shriveled.
Profitability determined which hospitals could afford new
projects, and private boards and executives decided how to
deploy those funds.
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Medicare’s (and private insurers’) capital payment policies
have undergone many twists and turns over the past half
century. But the link between profitability and ability to expand and modernize has been a constant. In effect, all nonfederal hospitals have been forced to become quasicommercial enterprises, and to think of themselves in business
rather than social terms4. As profitability became mandatory
for hospital survival, the distinction between for-profit and
non-profit hospitals began to erode—although even decades
later, for-profits continued to deliver inferior quality care at
higher prices.7,8
The price-boosting that Ly identifies as a key profit-driver
(among non-profit as well as investor-owned hospitals) is just
one of the ill-effects of making profit margin the mission.
Hospitals’ manipulations of their payer and service mixes,
the efforts squandered on financial gaming, and the ethical
compromises that have become commonplace in the
healthcare milieu are also, like price gauging, antithetical to
the public’s interests.
Hospitals’ efforts to avoid money-losing patients, effectively
excluding many of those most in need, have become so routine
that many of us have become inured to this disgrace. New York
City’s private academic medical centers exclude almost all
uninsured persons and maintain separate clinic systems for
patients with Medicaid, leading to the de facto racial as well
as socioeconomic segregation of care,9 a situation that is not
unique to New York. The CEO of the Mayo Clinic—which
generated an operating surplus of $707 million last year, while
investing $714 million in new capital projects—instructed employees to Bprioritize^ patients with private insurance over
those with Medicaid, and even Medicare.10,11
The profit imperative, even among non-profit hospitals,
similarly distorts the mix of services that hospitals choose to
offer or promote. Money-losing services like mental health
and primary care are accorded second-class status, in contrast
to the opulent resources devoted to elective cardiac and orthopedic interventions, even those of dubious value.
Selectively recruiting profitable patients and excluding the
unprofitably ill require considerable bureaucratic effort and
expense. But that is just the beginning. Much more is spent to
maximize billings and collect payment. At one non-profit Utah
hospital system, 2300 employees, 6% of all employees, work
on claims processing and bill collections.12 Meanwhile, the
patient chart has morphed from a clinical diary for facilitating
care into a billing document driven by commercial imperatives, padded with redundant (and even misleading) material.
Physicians now spend half their time on electronic documentation and other clerical/administrative tasks.13 Overall, the
average US hospital now devotes more than one quarter of
its budget to administration, a share that is continuing to
increase, and is already twice that in Canada (or Scotland).14
Why is hospital administration so much leaner in Canada?
Although physician payment in Canada’s single-payer system
looks a lot like US Medicare’s, its hospital payment strategy is
dramatically different, more akin to the way we fund the VA.
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Canadian provinces (and Scotland) pay hospitals’ global operating budgets, with separate government grants for capital
costs. Even countries like France, Switzerland, and Germany
which have more complex universal social insurance schemes,
fund much of new hospital investments through government
grants rather than hospitals’ profits. This dampens US-style
entrepreneurial incentives, leading to lower bureaucratic costs,
less price-inflating gaming, and greater healthcare equity.
Profit-seeking does not just undermine efficiency and equity, it also fosters corruption. For-profit hospital firms have
been most frequently implicated in the most egregious incidents, paying billions to settle fraud and abuse claims. But the
faltering moral compass of non-profit and even public hospital
leaders has an even greater impact because they control 80%
of community hospitals, and almost all academic medical
centers. Massachusetts General Hospital received $123 million in royalties and licenses over a four-year period,15 mostly
from orthopedic device-makers whose high prices are borne
largely by Medicare. In 2013, 73 leaders of academic medical
centers also sat on the boards of 85 publicly traded healthcare
firms, receiving median compensation of $209,000 per directorship, and, in addition, held 5,493,946 shares of stock in
those firms.16 It takes extraordinary ethical gymnastics to
justify such dual commitments.
Ly implies that a crackdown on hospital prices would lead
to salutary change, goading hospitals to seek profit through
efficiency. But controlling prices without eliminating profits
could amplify current profit-inflating misbehaviors, e.g., prioritizing the care of privately insured patients. As long as
profit-centered care remains the key to hospital survival,
patient-centered and community-centered care will suffer.
No law of nature requires that hospitals make profits in
order to thrive. What is needed is a single-payer reform that:

&
&
&

Pays hospital lump-sum operating budgets, like those for
schools, fire houses, or VA hospitals;
Claws back any money they do not spend on care; and
Allocates truly needed capital funding through a regionwide accountable government grant program that directs
investments to the highest priority, community responsive
projects.
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